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Knowledge and Belief 
Prof. Zakaria Bashir Imam * 
 
The Aim of this study : 
The aim of this study is to give a systematic exposition of the Islamic philosophers' views on " 
knowledge and belief ". Their repeated, though perhaps unsuccessful, attempts to define these 
allusive concepts are surveyed, starting with al-Kindi and ending up with al - Ghazali. lbn Rushd 
was left out , because he represents a category of his own , whereas these "Oriental" Islamic 
philosophers, more or less , belong to the same cultural milieu . 
The outcome of this study is an attempt to show: 
 
(i) that these Oriental Islamic philosophers were basically great synthesizers,  who managed to 
amalgamate major strands of philosophical thought, Islamic, Greek and Oriental, into one 
homogeneous and coherent system of philosophy. 
(ii) that they argued for and emphasized the oneness of truth, irrespective of the source(s) from 
which it is drawn, and that divinely revealed knowledge and  pure rational philosophical truth , 
ultimately merge together and lead to the same conclusions . 
(iii) finally, that, for these Islamic philosophers, all human knowledge, whatever its definition may 
be, and whatever its sources, will not be possible without the postulation of some sort of a 
transcendental divine help or intervention. Even natural reason itself is a divine gift , let alone 
these extra-rational sources of inspiration, introspection and intuition. Ibn Rushd stands separately, 
because he subscribed very staunchly to Aristotelian realism. 
 
 [1] Prologue: The Greek Conception of Knowledge 
 
The strive to acquire knowledge is a basic human propensity. Aristotle says that every man desires 
naturally to know . Arab philosophers express this notion by saying that man is a tul'ah (i.e; he is 
by nature inquisitive). According to Plato , nothing deserves the name of knowledge unless it is 
the knowledge of that which is real, universal and unchangable, i.e, knowledge of the forms or 
ideas, which constitute the highest realm of Being, i.e., Being which is most primary and in the 
fullest sense of the word . The sensible things of this world exist in a secondary sense as shadows 
and imitations, imperfect exemplifications of the Forms, which are the real prototypes of which 
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the sensible things are mere imitations. In the middle between the world of Forms and the world 
of sensible things is the world of intellegible entities . To Plato , the understanding of the sensible 
things is no more than mere Doxa, i.e, mere belief or mere opinion . Mere belief is not knowledge 
. It is merely thought of as real knowledge by someone who mistakenly believes to have attained 
true knowledge, like the state of the man in the simile of the cave (in Plato's Republic ). So long 
as he is confined to the cave, he wrongly identifies the shadows he sees in the wall of the cave as 
the real things, outside the cave. The soul only attains true knowledge by a process of meditation 
and reminiscence in a dynamic practice in the ascending dialectic, until it comes to have a direct 
intuition (Noein) of the Forms. The highest, supreme Form is that of the Good and the Beautiful. 
Aristotle disregarded the theory of the forms, but continued to be influenced by the salient features 
of Plato's theory of knowledge as true belief, justified and reinforced by direct intuition, i.e, by a 
logos. To Aristotle, as it was to Plato, the object of knowledge must be real and universal. Since 
Aristotle has rejected the theory of Forms, the object of knowledge, for him, was the true universal 
quidity or essence of things, which is both real and permanent. This could be attained either by a 
direct, simple inference, or by a syllogistic inference which proceeds from true, apodictic premises 
to a true conclusion, which is truely and necessarily implied by these premises, in accordance with 
the rules of correct, valid inference. Thus, the Theory of the Syllogism came to represent Aristotle's 
theory of true, certain knowledge. As this theory is deductive, representing relations between 
universal terms, and inference from true, necessary premises to true necessary conclusion, so the 
knowledge obtainable from it is, likewise, deductive logical knowledge, with no direct 
implications for the real factual world. Thus it is controversial whether the theory of the 
Aristotelian syllogism has any direct bearing on the world, i.e, whether or not it has any existential 
presuppositions. Be that as it may, the dominant character of the syllogism is formal, i.e, its validity 
is primarily determined by the form alone, irrespective of the material component. No resort to the 
world is essential in the process of validating a syllogism, and quite often the premises are known 
to be true because they are intuitively so, being primitive, self-evident logical truths. Thus, the 
Greek methodology of knowledge, whether Platonic or Aristotelian continued to be speculative in 
nature, with no crucial dependence on experience or observation of the factual, material 
happenings of the world. 
[2] The Nature of Knowledge in the Qur'an 
A new conception of knowledge became gradually known with the revelation of the Qur’ an 
knowledge in the Qur’ an is true, certain and indubitable knowledge of what truely exists in its 
own right. Thus knowledge must be totally free from doubt or misgivings. In the Qur'anic 
conception of things, this kind of knowledge is primordially the knowledge possessed by Allah 
  
Gezira Journal _ Tafakkur_ vol (1)(2) - (2)(1)1999-2000 
v  
 
2000-1999)(2)(1 -rnal _ Tafakkur_ vol (1)(2) ouGezira J 
Alone, and is revealed in His Divine Scriptures, especially the Qur'an. Man can acquire this 
knowledge from the Divine Scriptures, but he can also acquire it if he employs his mind correctly. 
Thus valid objective  rational inference is also conducive to true, indubitable knowledge. The 
intellect is a precious divine gift, and is therefore a reliable source of true apodictic knowledge. 
However, reason can not function without the mediation of the senses. Thus sensible knowledge 
is only an initial stage, in the form of sense-data. It is both pictorial and particularistic. Universal 
concepts are supplied by the intellect, on the occasion of its reception of these sense-data. But the 
sense-data themselves are real, and in the normal condition (i.e. the recipient being quite sobre, in 
the full possession of his faculties,etc.), they are real depictions of the corresponding reality outside 
the mind : thus the Qur'an talks about the knowledge of the external world as certain knowledge." 
 
  Allah (SWT) says in the Holy Qur'an 
   
    " مهانيتآ نيذلا مهءانبأ نوفرعي امك هنوفرعي باتكلا 
    نإو مهنم اقيرف هو قحلا نومتكيل نوملعي م" (1) 
 
i.e. This verse can be rendered as : " Those unto whom We gave the Scripture recognize it ( this 
revelation ), as they recognize  their sons. 
 Allah also said in the Holy Qur'an 
 
" وأ رم يذلاك هذه يحي ىنأ لاق ، اهشورع ىلع ةيواخ ىهو ةيرق ىلع ةئام الله هتامأف ! اهتوم دعب الله هثعب مث ماع  لاق  ؟تثبل مك
اموي تثبل لاق ىلإ رظناو هنستي مل كبارشو كماعط ىلإ رظناف ، ماع ةئام تثبل لب لاق ! موي ضعب وأ  سانلل ةيآ كلعجنلو كرامح
امحل اهوسكن مث اهزشنن فيك ماظعلا ىلإ رظناو ...…نيبت املف لع الله نأ ملعأ لاق هل .. ريدق ءيش لك ى" (2) 
 
This verse can be rendered , in English, as follows " or (ponder you of) the like of him who, passing 
by a township which had fallen into utter ruin, exclaimed : How shall Allah give this township life 
after its death? And Allah made him die a hundred years, then brought him back to life. He said : 
How long have you tarried ? He (the man) said : I have tarried only for a day or a part of a day ! 
He (Allah) said : Nay, but you have tarried for a hundred years! Just look at your food and drink , 
they have not rotted and look at your ass ; and that we may make you a token unto mankind. And 
look at the bones (of your ass), how we adjust them and then cover them with flesh! And when the 
matter became clear unto him, he said : I know now that Allah is capable of doing everything." 
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Verses in the Qur'an which commend knowledge, and invite man to use his mind, and his senses 
in the pursuit of knowledge are very numerous indeed. Of these verses, Muslim philosophers such 
as al-kindi, al-Farabi, Ibn Sinna and Ibn Rushd, were fond to repeat the following ones 
 
   "اوربتعاف بابللأا ىلوأ اي" (3) 
  
This verse can be translated in English, as follows : 
 
"so learn a lesson, O men of understanding " 
The Arabic word (Fa'tabirou), has been understood differently by Muslim scientists and 
philosophers of antiquity ; whereas the scientists understood it to mean " experiment with "  so 
that al-I'tibar meant, for them, experimentation, the philosophers understood it to mean " deduce.", 
so that al-l'tibar meant, for them deducing or deduction. Thus the word I'tibar became part of the 
philosophical technical Jargon, and meant both inductive inference or the methods thereof. 
Another Qur'anic verse which has often been quoted by Islamic philosophers, such as al-Farabi, 
Ibn Sina, and Ibn Rushd, is the following verse : 
 
  "مهيرنس قحلا هنأ مهل نيبتي ىتح مهسفنأ ىفو قافلآا يف انتايآ . 
             وأ ءيش لك ىلع هنأ كبرب فكي مل ديهش" (4) 
 
This verse can be translated as follows : 
" we shall show them Our portents on the horizons and  
within themselves, until it will be manifest unto them 
 that it is the Truth ! 
Do not your Lord suffice, since 
He is witness over all things" 
 
Underlying this obvious Qur'anic emphasis on the need to find and provide evidence for 
knowledge claims, and the Qur’anic allusion that this evidence could be sought in the universe and 
within the mind and the soul, is the acknowledgement that mere subjective belief, no matter how 
strongly it is adhered to emotionally, will not suffice as an objective criterion of knowledge . 
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Objective criteria of knowledge indicated in the Holy Qur’an, are as follows : A claim constitutes 
a knowledge claim if and only if 
1. it is free from contradictions, internally within the claim itself or externally, i.e., it does not 
contradict an established fact of the world. 
2. it is certain, and cannot be doubted ; a knowledge claim is indubitable. Both its contradictory 
and contrary must be definitely false, so that its truth cannot be doubted, no matter what happens. 
In the words of al-Ghazali, even if someone tries to falsify a knowledge claim which is indubitable 
and apodictic, and in his eagerness to impress us, he was able to change his stick into a snake, we 
will not feel in the least persuaded to doubt what we have established as indubitable knowledge, 
although we may wonder at his ability to change the stick into a snake!! 
3. In order to pass as indubitable knowledge, a knowledge claim must be supported by valid proofs 
or arguments. These proofs and arguments must serve as solid grounds supporting what we take 
as certain knowledge. Thus the certainty at issue is not mere strong subjective belief, resting on 
the strength of our emotional convictions no matter how dogmatically held. The certainty at issue 
is epistemic certainty, resting on objective, intersubjective and rationally demonstrable proofs or 
arguments. The validity of those proofs and arguments must be decided by experts in the relevant         
field (Ahl oz-Zikr) : 
 
   "اولأساف  نوملعت لا متنك نإ ركذلا لهأ(5)" 
 
  Alla says in the Qur'an : 
" Ask the people with true knowledge if you do not know" 
This Qur'anic demand that knowledge claims must be supported by valid proofs and arguments; 
i.e. valid in the strong epistemic sense of being objectively decidable by a community of experts 
in the relevant field, can be documented by many explicit verses of the Quran itself : 
 
"اولاقو نم لاإ ةنجلا لخدي نل ىراصن وأ ادوه ناك  كلت ، مهينامأ 
لق  نيقداص متنك نإ مكناهرب اوتاه" (6) 
"and they say : No one will enter paradise, unless he be a Jew or a Christian. These are their own 
wishful thoughts . Say : bring your proof (of what you say), if you are truthful ... " 
 
The Mu'tazilites' conception of knowledge 
  
Gezira Journal _ Tafakkur_ vol (1)(2) - (2)(1)1999-2000 
v  
 
2000-1999)(2)(1 -rnal _ Tafakkur_ vol (1)(2) ouGezira J 
The Mu'tazilites (al- Mu'tazilah) were a school of Islamic philosophical thought, that was active 
in Iraq in the second, third and fourth centuries A.H. They were rationalists, and sought a thorough 
rationalization of the basic tenets of Islam. In their view, true knowledge is of three types or levels 
(7) : 
1. The first level is primitive a priori knowledge like the knowledge of the ten Aristotelian 
categories, together with space and time. It is also knowledge of propositions like : 
1) 2+2 = 4. 
2) Nothing could exist at two different places at the same time. 
3) The whole is greater than the part. 
These kinds of primitive truths are universally ascended to because they are a priori, in- built, so 
to speak, in the human understanding . 
2.The second level is that of true, intuitive knowledge, which is obtainable by the eye of reason , 
i.e. the internal sense, counterpart of the external sense of eye-sight. Thus, we "see" by this internal 
sense that: 
1)  every effect has a cause. 
2)   that every complex object or artifact has a creator or maker. 
3) That God exists, as the Creator and Designer of this world, is intuitively knowable, according 
to the Mu'tazilites. When their critics denied that knowledge of God's existence is intuitive, in this 
sense because atheists exist, and are abound, they retorted by saying that only stupidity, 
unthougtfulness, laziness of the mind and imagination, and forgetfulness, could impair any one 
from seeing that " God exist" is a basic, intuitive truth. 
3. In the third level, there is inferred or logical knowledge. This is indirect knowledge, where 
deductions are involved. If the premises were true, and the rules of logical inference correctly 
applied, then the truths that result, as consequences, are necessarily true propositions. 
According to the Mu'tazilites all truths reached in these three levels or types of knowledge are 
necessary, apodictic truths, that are certain, and not open to any doubt. Thus, knowledge is always 
certain and indubitable. Nothing could be called knowledge, unless it is, at the same time certain 
in this way. Thus, the Mu'tazilite conception of knowledge is a corollary of the Qur'anic conception 
of knowledge in many respects. According to Abu al-Huzail al- Alaf, one of the early founders of 
the Mu'tazilites, the first stage in the pursuit of knowledge is to doubt and expel false, 
unsubstantiated beliefs, irrespective of the sources from which these false beliefs issue. Then, by 
speculative and deductive knowledge, a person should ponder himself and his consciousness, and 
obtain, as a result, an intuitive knowledge of himself, as a created being, in need of a creator. To 
Abu al-Huzail al- Alaf, this is the first certitude ( the first apodictic truth). 
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The second level of certitude is to infer that God exists, as a creator, since it follows logically, for 
Abu al-Huzail, that, a created being, must have a creator, which is Allah (subhanahu wa ta'ala). 
This line of thinking, reminds us, quite naturally, of Rine Descartes; his method of doubt, his 
Cogito, and his clear and distinct ideas that are necessarily true. The Mu'tazilites preceded 
Descartes by almost a thousand years. 
 
As rationalists, the Mu'tazilites affirmed the being of mental concepts. Mental concepts are things 
( Ashya; singular : Shay)(8). A Shay is something known or is knowable. It does not have to be a 
concrete material thing. For them, conceptions are mental propositions, and as such they signify 
facts, i.e., mental facts, which are a dimension of being, even more real than concrete material 
objects since they are prior in being to the particularized objects. The soul is a thing, i.e., a Shay' , 
because it is intuitively knowable. It was also a Shay' , before its creation, because it was known, 
i.e., in God's knowledge. Thus mental propositions, propositions which are affirmations or 
negations about mental objects, signify certain, apodictic knowledge according to the Mu'tazilites. 
The theory that mental objects are things (Ashya') is ascribable to Abu al-Hu'zail al-Alaf, who is 
said to be the first Mu'tazilite to advocate it. The epistemic and logical importance of the 
Mu'tazilites' discussion of the concept of "ash-Sha'yyah" (i.e. Thingness) must not be overlooked. 
As rationalists, they wanted to affirm the being of mental propositions as facts, depicting real 
entities, not in the material sense of being concrete particular things, but as concepts that exist in 
the understanding. Thus, the realm of being is not to be exhausted by concrete material things; and 
logical predications do not necessarily presuppose the existence of material things. A true 
proposition, may presuppose the being of abstract entities. For those abstract entities to have true 
being, it suffices to know them by the direct intuition of the internal sense, in normal conscious 
experience. The allusion to normal consciousness is meant to exclude hallucinations, aberrations, 
malfunctions of the brain etc. etc.... 
 
Al-Farabi's Conception of Knowledge: 
In his "Kitabu al Burhan"  Al Farabi indicated his definition of knowledge as follows(9). 
" The word knowledge " ILM" signifies true apodictic belief " tasdiq", which is a true apodictic 
belief concerning the existence of and the cause of that which is known" 
Then al- Farabi defines " true apodictic belief (al- Yaqin ad-Daruri") as that "Tasdiq" which 
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1) could not be otherwise, i.e., cannot be doubted, no matter what happens. Its contradictory is 
known to be definitely false, and whose 
2) object (i.e., that which is known) must be of those things whose being (or existence) is 
wugood ) "-Daimat al -Umur ad-g (fi alomnitemporal, i.e., always existin يف دوجولا ةمئادلا روملأا"  (10) 
An example of this type of certain knowledge is the propostion : 
The whole is greater than the part 
Thus for al- Farabi, this absolute certain knowledge is "yaqin Daruri" i.e. apodictic certitude. The 
objects of this Yaqin Daruri, exist necessarily in the sense that they are omnitemporal. The objects 
signified by the proposition contrary to that of apodictic knowledge are impossible to exist. So 
what is known necessarily also exists necessarily, i.e., what exists necessarily, if it is ever known 
must be known with certainty (i.e., bi Yagin Daruri)(11) 
Two considerations stand out very clearly, concerning al- Farabi's definition of "ILM" or 
knowledge : 
 
1) It is necessarily anchored in the independent being or existence of things-in-themselves. To 
him, nothing yields true apodictic knowledge unless 
(i) it has independent existence, or being 
(ii) that existence or being is omnitemporal, i.e., is always the case, unchangeable. 
2) Secondly, it is related to the causes of these existing objects. 
The relationship between knowledge and its objects is reciprocal, certain knowledge implies that 
its object is omnitemporal in their being or existence, while omnitemporally existing things impart 
true apodictic knowledge to us. Now, we may legitimately ask : How much of this Farabian 
conception of knowledge is Greek (Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus)? and how much is originally 
Farabian ? In so far as knowledge to al -Farabi, is knowledge of omnitemporal objects, it bears an 
obvious resemblance to both Plato and Aristotle. It is Platonic in so far as its objects are not 
particular material objects, because these are not omnitemporal in their existence. So these objects 
must be abstract, mental objects. But it is Aristotelian in the sense that these objects exist in time, 
and they are somehow related to concrete material objects; much as forms are related to matter. 
 
Be that as it may, al Farabi's definition of true certain, apodictic knowledge can not be divorced 
from his general theory of knowledge : This theory is related to the powers of the human soul or 
reason on the one hand, and to the abstract immaterial intellects, on the other hand . The interaction 
between the human intellect and these immaterial Intellects (Uqul Mufariqah) is a dual-carriage 
way, which is described and expounded in al-Farabi's theory of knowledge, and which consists of 
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five stages of jadal (Dialectic). To al-Farabi, as it was to both Plato, and Plotinus, this jadal (or 
dialectic) has two movements, one ascending, the other descending . 
 
The ascending dialectic is the action of the human intellect in its quest to obtain true, apodictic 
knowledge. The ascending dialectic starts from the sensible world and moves upward towards the 
Active Intellect (al-Aql al Fa'al), and beyond. In the process of this ascending dialectic, the human 
intellect goes through the following successive transformations : 
 
1. Al- Aql bil Quwah : Initially, the human intellect is a " Aql bil Quwah, i.e, a potential readiness 
to receive sensible impression of sensible objects. For al-Farabi, man as a rational animal has a 
potential capacity to understand . This capacity has two aspects : (i) The first aspect is the mere 
readiness of the human soul to understand (ii) the second aspect is that this understanding has, as 
a built-in faculty , to acquire universal concepts, divorced from their sensible images. These 
universal concepts exist, potentially in the intellect of all humans, even in children . They are thus 
prior to every experience . They only become felt or actual, when sense-data are received by the 
mind, due to the infringement of physical objects on it. While Aristotle represents the 
understanding, in this initial state, as the empty tableau, Al-Farabi seem to prefer another simile : 
likening this initial state of the understanding to a shapeless Mass of Wax. (12) In this initial stage, 
of al' Aql bil Quwah, the human understanding is the mere capacity to receive the sense- data. 
 
2. Al-'Aql bil Fi'l : When the understanding is conscious of these sensible impressions as definite 
concepts, it becomes transformed from passive to active intelligence: It is transformed from Aql 
bil Quwah to Aql bil Fi'l. This transformation is brought out by the action of Al-Aql al-Fa'al; that 
is the Active Intellect, which subsists on its own right. The significance of this Active Intellect is 
that it influences and controls the world of being and corruption . 
 
3. Al- 'Aql al- Mustafad : This is the capacity of the understanding to ponder its concepts, and 
further more to manipulate them . It is the power responsible for such processes as analysis, 
synthesis, criticism, classification and differentiation . Thus al-'Aql al- Mustafad is the speculative, 
analytical mind, capable of innovation and synthesis. It is a higher stage of being than al-'Aql bil 
Fi'l, (i.e. Actual Intellect). Again, the human understanding achieves this development, due to the 
action of the Active Intellect, which is a metaphysical entity. 
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4.  The Union with al-'Aql al-Fa'al: The union with al-'Aql al-Fa'al ( The Active Intellect) becomes 
possible only after the development of al-'Aql al-Mustafad, which is the highest stage in the 
ascending dialectic of the Farabian theory of knowledge. In cultivating this 'Aql al- Mustafad, a 
person becomes close to  al- Aql al-Fa'al, because it becomes clear and clean, like a mirror, ready 
to receive the emanations proceeding from that Active Intellect. 
 
According to al-Farabi, only very special persons can achieve this high stage of being able to unite 
or even to have constant contact with Active Intellect. But if any one wants to achieve it , then one 
must be pensive, and meditative to such a high degree that this becomes a second nature to him or 
her . However , the nature of this exercise of al - Aql al- Mustafad, by means of which it is able to 
achieve union with the Active Intellect (the tenth Intelligent of Platonus) is strictly theoretical, 
according to al-Farabi. No talk about the purgation of soul or the cleansing of heart is found in al-
Farabi. 
 
Such esoteric , mystical theory was first developed by lbn Sina. For al-Farabi, the highest 
perfection , by means of which man achieves his summum bonum, i.e., his greatest happiness is, 
as it was for Aristotle, pure philosophical reflection or meditation . In other words, those capable 
of developing their intellectual faculty to the most, the prophets and the philosophers, are the only 
candidates to achieve union with the Active Intellect, and to draw directly from the knowledge 
therein (13). 
Ibn Sina's Theory of Knowledge 
Ibn Sina is an indirect student of al-Farabi. He himself has explicitly acknowledged this, in his 
autobiography. The new development which we find in Ibn Sina, is his introduction of the concept 
of al-lrtiyadh, i.e., mystical experience of purgation of the soul and heart, through the techniques 
of fasting, exclusion, practicing long period of prayers, together with the total abstention from any 
material or worldly indulgence of any sort. In short, Ibn Sina involves the necessity to cultivate, 
what we may call mystical or esoteric intuition, in addition to the strictly intellectual . That is to 
say, Ibn Sina involves the whole of the soul, which he calls the self (an-Nafs) in his quest to obtain 
knowledge of the higher, divine order, proceeding from the Active Intellect. Ibn Sina himself was 
not known to have led a mystical life, and doubts were expressed, by his opponents, that he was 
talking about a topic, namely mysticism, of which he had no first-hand experience. Be that it may, 
his description of mystical experience (14), how it comes about, and the various stages through 
which it passes, is so vivid and sincere, and so close to the standard accounts, given by leading 
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mystical saints of Islam , that one is tempted to believe that he might have had some genuine 
mystical experience, of some sort or other. 
 
Thus, in Ibn Sina, are found all the essential features of al-Farabi's theory of knowledge. This is 
hardly surprising, as Ibn Sina explicitly acknowledges his philosophical indebtedness to al-Farabi 
as we indicated above. The new elements in Ibn Sina are due to the following factors: 
1.  His contact with more Islamic and more oriental, emanational sources, especially lkhwan 
as-Safa ( the Brethern of Purity) and the Ismailiyyah. 
2. His more independent, philosophical inclination, and his oriental philosophy. 
3. Because of these two factors (namely (1) and (2)) , Ibn Sina left his own finger prints, not only 
in his late works, such as "Al- lsharat wa at-Tanbihat (Remarks and Admonitions)" and his 
"Muntig al-Mushriqeen", but also in his earlier works, such as the voluminous, encyclopaedic, 
"Ash- Shifa” . In  “ ash- Shifa", Ibn Sina was not a mere compilor, but an independent author, who 
gave himself, a sizable latitude of freedom, in the exposition of peripatetic philosophy. He 
exercised some freedom in deleting those topics, which seemed trivial or unimportant to his mind, 
while he elaborated others, which seemed important and substantive. Shortcomings of the basic 
Aristotelian text were rectified, by lbn Sina, and some implicit points were made explicit. In his 
exposition of the Aristotelian logic, Ibn Sina made some addtions of his own, so as to make that 
logic more applicable to the world of empirical facts. In these additions, he emphasized the 
material component of logical arguments. In his quest to make logic more applicable to inductive 
matters, Ibn Sina made elaborate studies on modal and temporal syllogistic logic. 
To Ibn Sina, as it was to al-Farabi, certain indubitable knowledge is firmly rooted in the facts of 
real, objective, self - subsistent existence, and the chain of causation operative therein. Thus a valid 
logical argument, which constitutes a logical demonstration (i.e. Burhan) must proceed from true, 
indubitable premises, satisfies the rules of valid logic, and must yield, in the end, a true, indubitable 
conclusion. To Ibn Sina, these premises could be 
1) Logical primary truths, such as : 
- the whole is greater than the part, 
- two quantities which are equal to one same quantity must be equal to each other, etc,etc ... 
2)  Definitions, mainly having to do with classification of genus and species, etc..   
(1)  and (2) ( are called by him al-Awaliyat), (i.e. primitive truths). 
3)  Matters of immediate sense experience, both of the external and the internal senses, are called 
by him al-Mushahadat. 
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4) Consistent reports, given by a group of people who could not agree to delibrately misreport 
what they had witnessed. These, Ibn Sina calls 'al-Mutawatirat". That is to say, reliable reporting 
by almost all the independent narrators of different regions and different times, and different 
sources of information, each of them reporting quite independently of the others, so that it is 
practically impossible for them to collude on lying or misreporting of what they witnessed or heard. 
In so far as both religion and historical events are reports of past or mystical events, the importance 
of this Sinian innovation could not be overestimated. His break with Aristotle and other Greek 
sources, is so enormous that attempts to trace these Sinian innovations to ancient Greek sources 
have failed. The orientalists  either tried to underestimate this great Sinian addition to logic and 
the theory of knowledge, or else tried to trace it back to Stoic or Megarian sources. Yet, the Greeks 
did not have any knowledge of the methodology of valid narration ('llm al-Riwayah). This science 
was developed by the Arabs, even before the advent of Islam. The Arabs employed it in the science 
of genealogy, of which they were so obsessed. Pure unmixed genealogy was a hallmark of noble 
birth, for these pre-Islamic Arabs. The Arabs also made use of this science of valid narration to 
conserve their history, often recorded in long poems which were transmitted, by word of mouth. 
Abu Bakr, the first Rightly-guided Khalif, was known to be an authority on Arab history and 
geneology. He was known to have an incredible memory, on which he relied. 
 
Thus, the science of Riwayah (narration) is an Arabic and Islamic science, which was cultivated 
to very high standards, by Ahl al-Hadith. Historians, too, made great efforts to develop this 
essentially Arabic science. They used it in the documentation of historical events. The Muslim 
jurists, on the other hand, used it, in their studies of the Islmaic political and administrative offices. 
Those jurists gave it a new name, when they called it 'IIm ar-Rijal, i.e., the science of ( the 
characters of ) men. 
 
Be that as it may, Ibn Sina thus managed to cultivate a comprehensive theory of knowledge which 
draws on three basic sources : 
(1) The first source is through contact with the spiritual celestial beings and with Allah, (Subhanhu 
wa ta'alla). One of these chief spritual, or celestial Beings is al-'Aql al- Fa'al or the Active Intellect, 
i.e., the Giver of forms or ideas. For the Islamic philosophers (e.g. al- Farabi), this Active Intellect, 
is an angel, (possibly Gabriel) who is in charge of imparting knowledge to humans, either in the 
form of Wahi (or divine inspiration to prophets) or in the form of II'ham (divine inspiration to 
other than prophets). Ibn Sina here made much use of the conceptual framework, and the 
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conceptual machinery of Al-Farabi's theory of the union with the Active Intellect, although he 
introduced some modifications of his own. 
(2) The second source is the logical theory of the Aristotelian syllogism, and the self-evident 
primary truths contained in the premises of apodictic proofs. 
(3) The third source is that of empirical experience, especially direct sense-experience of the 
external and the internal senses. 
Thus Ibn Sina succeeds in building a comprehensive theory of knowledge, with a very broad 
epistemic base : his apodictic syllogism (Burhan) makes use of self-evident true premises drawn 
from various sources: 
i) Religious texts of the Qur'an, sunnah, and from documented historical sources (these are the 
Muta-watirat). 
ii) empirical knowledge based on direct sense-experience (Direct External Sense). 
iii) true mystical experience of the heart (Direct Internal Sense). 
iv) logical axioms, definitions or primitive truths of rational intuitions, i.e., a priori logical 
knowledge. 
v) proven theories and past accumulated valid experiences of the human race. 
 
Ibn Sina's theory of contact with Active Intellect 
Ibn Sina does not speak of a union with the Active Intellect. However, he asserts that, in its highest 
state, the human intellect could achieve some kind of contact (or epistemic union) with the Active 
Intellect. this highest state is called by Ibn Sina al-'Aql al-Qudsi (Divine Intellect). In Ibn Sina, this 
Divine Intellect is a further development of the Acquired Intellect, considered by al-Farabi to be 
the highest stage in the mental and intellectual ascent of man. It can not be cultivated by mere 
theoretical or philosophical contemplation. Only the few elect can achieve it through mystical 
experience of an Islamic variety, the nature of which has been indicated earlier, in this study. 
Whereas, al-Farabi postulated the area of contact between man and the divine order, i.e. (the Active 
Intellect) to be the phantasia (al-Makhyalah), Ibn Sina made the 'Aql al-Qudsi (Holy Intellect) to 
be that point of contact. thus Ibn Sina, being more subtle and careful than al-Farabi, is not open to 
the charge that he put the philosopher (who uses both the Acquired and the Qudsi intellects) in a 
higher plain than the Prophet (who, according to Farabi) uses only the material Intellect or the 
phantasma. Thus, to Ibn Sina, the ascending stairs of human cognition is five-stepped: 
1. The Material (hylic) Reason which is either completely without any form, or as the bearer of 
primary logical truths. 
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2. Al-Aql bil-Malakah, which is actual Reason, with some concepts and forms actually formed in 
it by the Active Intellect, though, these concepts and forms are not actually felt; they are there as 
a potentiality. 
3. Then there is the actual intellect, (al-'Aql bil Fi'l). Here, we find actual primary logical truths as 
well as inferred truths. It is not yet reflective or critical understanding. However, even at this stage, 
the human Intellect is transformed from potentiality to actuality. 
4. The Acquired Intellect (or al-Aql al-Mustafad) is the critical, reflective Intellect, found in 
contemplative minds. It is the highest intellectual achievement according to al-Farabi, and only the 
few elect can develop it. 
5. The Holy or Divine Intellect (Aql al-Qudsi) is the highest faculty, according to Ibn Sina. It is a 
further development of the Acquired intellect, and is found only in some exceptionally pure-
hearted persons, of mystical persuasions, whereas, the Acquired Intellect can be cultivated by mere 
theoretical, philosophical reflection. This Holy Intellect can only be cultivated by mystical 
regimentation or "Irtiyadh ", according to Ibn Sina. 
It is only these individuals who manage to cultivate the Holy Intellect that can achieve a contact 
or union with the Active Intellect, according to ibn Sina. They become qualified to receive direct 
emanation of knowledge from the Active Intellect. Those with Holy Intellects, have hearts as clean 
and pure as polished mirrors. Thus, for Ibn Sina, the ideas, concepts and forms in the Active 
Intellect, become reflected in the Holy Intellect of al-'Arifeen wa al-Wasileen, i.e., those endowed 
with knowledge and contact, with the Active Intellect. If this contact takes the form of divine 
revelation, then he who achieves it is a prophet. But if it is mere divine inspiration, then he who 
achieves it is a mystical or sufi master or Saint (15), i.e., one who manages to join the rank and order 
of the celestial beings, an intellect of Iuminous nature constantly glorifying the Name of his Lord-
the Almighty.  
 
Al-Ghazali's Theory of Knowledge 
Al-Ghazali starts his discussion of the nature of true knowledge by criticising the Mu'tazilite 
definition of it: The Mu'tazilah say : 
"Knowledge is the belief which is congruent (Mutabiq) with the reality of object of the belief." Al-
Gazali maintains that this definition is mistaken, on three accounts : 
(i) Firstly, mere belief must be distinguished from true knowledge, no matter how strongly it is 
adhered to by the believer. The grounds for this strong adherence may be merely psychological, 
and subjective, lacking in any objective grounding. What distinguishes  true knowledge from mere 
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belief, in al-Gazali's opinion, is that, in the case of true knowledge, the knower is consciously 
maintaining one of the two contraries of the matter ; while at the same time constantly considering 
the other end or extreme, but refusing to accept it on epistemic grounds. While on the case of mere 
belief, the believer is adamantly refusing to consider the contrary position, without having any 
valid epistemic grounds for this proposal. 
(ii) Secondly, the Mu'tazilie definition of knowledge as : "I'tiqadu a Shay 'ala-ma huwa 'alayhi" 
makes knowledge a function of (al-ashya'), i.e., existing things. But, says al-Ghazali, knowledge 
can be a function of non-existing things, that is knowledge about concepts of non-existing things 
which may subsist as abstract entities or quidities. At the root of this criticism, which al-Ghazali 
launches against al-Mu'tazilah' is the well-known disagreement between Ash'rites, (of whom 
al-Ghazali is here a spokesman), and al-Mu'tazilah about non-existing things: could we say that 
they are something (Shay') or not ? Al-Mu'tazilah believe that non-existing things are 
something, while the Ash'rites rejected this,and said non-existing things are not something 
(Shay'). 
(iii) Thirdly, mere belief, no matter how strongly adhered to : could be wrong, as is the case with 
beliefs held very firmly by ignorant people, who are mere followers of others (mere Muqalideen, 
i.e., copiers). AlGhazali gives the examples of some religious beliefs of the Scripturists (Jews and 
Christains), which, according to him, are plainly false, but which are very strongly held by them. 
 
The upshot of this Ghazalian criticism of the Mu'tazilite definition of knowledge is the following 
: 
i) Firstly, true knowledge could not be described as a belief simpliciter. The nature of belief 
simpliciter is a mere judgement, which may or may not be based on any concrete evidence, and as 
such it is closely associated with mere opinion, Dhun or Doxa. 
ii) Secondly, true knowledge is definitely not the beliefs adhered to by ignorant people, even if 
these beliefs happen to be true by mere chance, because they were held without valid reasons 
which are at the same time maintained consciously. 
iii) Thirdly, true knowledge has to do with real existing as well as non-existing things. That is to 
say, knowledge is either affirmative or negational. The affirmative knowledge is true if what is 
being affirmed is found to obtain in real, existing or subsisting terms, and negational knowledge 
is true if what is negated actually does not obtain. 
 
Moreover, mere beliefs are static; they are not changed, even though their objects do in fact change 
in reality ; while knowledge is dynamic, it changes if its real objects change. Mere belief is like a 
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fast knot, while knowledge is understanding and expounding .., i.e., the undoing of these knots of 
mere beliefs is knowledge, because knowledge is, in a way, a kind of unravelling or revealing. It 
is an expansion of our consciousness, and the satisfaction that attends that consciousness. 
 
Al-Ghazali's Characterization of True Knowledge 
Al-Ghazali believes that it is not possible to give a precise and comprehensive definition of 
knowledge. Therefore, he proposes to characterize it by the means of (a) an exhaustive 
enumeration, and (b) by an analogy. The exhaustive enumeration is meant to be an exhaustive 
enumeration of all the things that are definitely not true knowledge. Using the method of "al-subr 
wa at-Taqseem", which corresponds to the method of Residue in J.S. Mill, Al-Ghazali hopes to 
enumerate all types of non-knowledge, hoping that the residue will stand out clearly as what is 
meant by true knowledge. Then he goes on to give an analogy, which is a kind of representation 
of what happens when true knowledge of something is being acquired. 
 
As to the exhaustive list of all types of non-knowledge, they include : 
1. Doubt and falsehood (superstition, legends, methology) 
2.al-Dhun (Doxa) 
3. Mere belief, 
4. all types of psychological powers and disposition, e.g., the will, the power to do something. 
 
As to the analogy of true knowledge, al-Ghazali uses the simile of the mirror : The mind is like a 
mirror in that images and impressions of things outside to the mind are reflected into it, as they are 
in-them-selves, when existing, independently, out-side the mind. Thus these images and 
impressions and concepts, in our mind, are images and impressions of things out-side the mind. 
They look like exact(or very similiar) representations of the things-in-themselves. Al Ghazali uses 
the Arabic world "Suwar al-Ashya' to refer to these mental representation of the-things- in-
themselves. However, it is quite clear that "Suwar" does not simply mean images or pictures or 
even sense-impression : 
"What I mean with the expression "Suwar al-Ma'qulat" is "Haqiqatuha wa Mahiyatuha", i.e., the 
essence and the quidity of the things represented. 
 
This means, to al-Ghazali, that the forms or concepts (suwar) of what is known, are not mere 
images or impression; rather they are the real essences and quiddities of the things- in-themselves, 
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to use a Kantian jargon. Thus the mental representations of things-in-themselves, which al-Ghazali 
designates as 'Suwar al Maqulat" are a product of the mind, not arbitrarily, but as a result of the 
impingement of the images and sense-impressions of those things on the hyllic or material mind. 
They are thus "true" representations of those things-in-themselves, and they, supposedly, bear a 
close resemblance of how these things-in-themselves are in the realm outside the mind. But now 
do we know that they truely represent the nature of things-in-themselves? 
 
In the case of the mirror, we have the chance to compare our mental image, say of a cat, as a thing-
in-itself, and the picture of that cat on the mirror. In this way, we infer logically that since the 
image of that cat on the mirror, looks very much like our mental image of it, the two images (one 
mental, the other on the mirror) must be (1) images of one and the same thing (2) since the two 
images are similar, and since similarity always exists, whenever the cat in question appears, they 
must be similar to the cat-in-itself. (3) and thus, they represent the same true, permenant and 
objective feature of that cat ; something that subsists in the cat as it exists independently of both 
the mind and the mirror. 
 
Thus, for al-Ghazali, the analogy is not pushed to its extreme. The analogy between the mirror and 
mind is true to some extent, because whereas the impressions of things-known continue to be mere 
images and impressions in the mirror, which only passively receives them, the mind converts the 
images and impressions of the senses into forms, concepts, real essences and quiddities of the 
things-perceived or known. Thus, to the Islamists, starting from al-Farabi, and passing through Ibn 
Sina, and finally al-Ghazali, knowledge is not a mere phenomenon of the understanding alone, as 
it is for some idealists, like George Berkeley : Rather, it is a product of two things ; (1) the 
impingement of things-in-themselves outside on the mind, (ii) and the concepts which the mind 
supplies to the sense-data, which it receives. These concepts are not pictorial; they are abstract, 
and thus are totally free from any association with matter. concepts to al-Ghazali, as they are to 
Kant are a priori, being supplied by the mind from its own resources. They are prior to all 
experience ; yet they only become meaningful when they act as forms or frameworks to sensible 
experience. Before the reception of sense-data, these primary concepts are mere potentiality - 
inbuilt in the primitive original nature of the human soul. Thus, these prior concepts are a priori, 
not derived from sense experience, and without which sense-experience will not constitute 
knowledge or even understanding. The human self or soul is nothing but the faculty or instinct 
which is a repository of these a priori concepts. 
Definition: Eventually, al-Ghazali  defines  knowledge  as  follows : (16) 
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Knowledge or ('ilm) is the imprint in the mind of the essences and quiddities of things-in-
themselves, as they exist out-side the mind. 
 
The use of the word imprint or "Intiba" is misleading, in my view, because, what is so imprinted 
are not images or pictures, but abstract concepts which represent the essences and the quidities of 
things-in-themselves. The sense-impressions only exist in the common sense or even the Wahimah 
(i.e., short term memory). Al-Ghazali leaves no doubt in the mind of his readers, that what is 
imprinted in the mind, beyond the makhyalah (Fantasia) and the wahimah (short term memory) 
are not images or pictures, because he goes on to say that what is imprinted in the mind and heart 
of the human being is the Divine Presence in toto : "Al-Hadhrah Al-IIahiyah". Al-Ghazali then 
defines this Al-Hadhrah Al-Ilahiya as the sum of all existing things : 
"Jumlat al-Mawjudat" for nothing constitutes being or existence save Allah Ta'ala and His actions. 
(17) 
In conclusion, we may venture to say that, for the Islamic philosophers, i.e., “al-Farabi, Ibn Sina 
and al-Ghazali", although the process of understanding or acquiring knowledge starts with sense-
perception, it attains its full scope only through the action of the mind itself . The two factors, 
sense-impressions and mental concepts are together both necessary and sufficient, but separately 
each of them is a necessary factor of attaining knowledge. Although the mind is the dominant, 
commanding factor, yet without the senses and the sense-impressions, it is blind, and no 
knowledge can be acquired without the mediation of the five senses, and, for both Ibn Sina and al-
Ghazali, the internal sense.! 
 
To al-Ghazali, as it was to Ibn Sina, knowledge is essentially certain, and indubitable, and cannot 
be doubted at all. This indubitability (Yaqin) comes from the mind and equally from the things 
existing out-side the mind; al-Ghazali includes in the primary axiomatic true premises, not only 
primary logical truths, but also an exhaustive list of five types of indubitable truths, which can 
serve as true premises of valid, logical demonstrations or Burhan (proofs). These are the following 
: 
(1) Al-Awaliyat (primary primitive logical truths): 
 These are pure truths of reasons (Al-Aqliyat al-Mahdhah) to which we have already referred. e.g. 
(1) man's knowledge of the existence of soul (2) that a thing cannot have a property and its negation 
(3) that 2 = 1 + 1, (4) a thing cannot both be eternal and has a beginning in time (Muhdath) 
(2) Al-Mushahadat al-Batinah: 
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 These are propositions of direct acquaintance by the internal sense, e.g., man's knowledge of his 
own hunger, thirst, fear, and joy. These are not caused by the five senses, they are purely 
psychological conditions which could be known to the animals, the young children and grown-ups 
alike. in contrast to the al-Awaliyat Al-'Qliyah, which can only be known by grown-ups. 
(3) "Al-Mahsusat Az-Zahirah" : 
 These are direct acquaintance by the external sense , e.g., 
(1) snow is white 
(2) The Sun is luminous 
(3) The Moon is round 
(4) At-Tajribiyat : 
 These are acquired from habitual experience ,e.g., 
(1) fire burns 
(2) Bread satisfies hunger 
(3) stone falls down, if unsupported  
(4)  wine intoxicates. 
 
Al-Ghazali says that the indubitability of these propositions, drawn from experience, is not due to 
the senses alone, internal or external. Their indubitability is derived from repeated experience. 
Those who have not had any experience with respect to At-Tajribiyat may doubt or even deny 
them. But men of common experience will know them with certainty .., e.g., a physician will know 
with certainty that Siqmunia causes diarrhea; and a scientist will know with certainty that a magnet 
attracts iron. In so far as these Tajribiyat are universal propositions, they are not known by the 
senses alone. These Tajribiyat are known by the mind or intellect, through the mediation of the 
senses, or by repeated observations. Through repeated observations, the mind knows, by means of 
a covert syllogistic inference, that , for instance, 
1. Fire warms 
2. Bread satisfies hunger 
Since these two propositions are repeatedly the case, they could not be true by accident, but they 
must express causal connections, which explain their continuity. Habitual constant conjunctions 
between causes and their effects is a sure sign and a necessary condition of causal efficacy, in al-
Ghazali's opinion. However, it is not a sufficient condition. What al-Ghzali denies in (Tahafut al-
Falasifah) is the proposition that the connection cause and effect is a sufficient one. Thus At-
Tajribiyat must be distinguished from Al-Hisiyat (whether internal or external) in that while the 
latter involves direct acquaintance by means of the senses (internal & external), the former 
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involves indirect inference, which assumes or presupposes the law of causation, and makes use of 
it. Those who do not possess knowledge of At-Tajribiyat , however,  will do well to ask those who 
are in possession of this knowledge, just as a blind man must ask men with normal vision to tell 
him, by means of geometrical proofs, the real size of the sun, for instance . 
(5) Al-Mutawatirat : (concurrent reports): 
These are reports, authentic, reliable and documented reports, which we accept on the authority of 
the reporters, e.g., 
- Makka exists 
- Ash-Shafi'i once existed 
- The Muslim's daily prayers are five in number 
Al-Mutawatirat, like At-Tajribiat, must be repeatedly ascertained : knowledge does not obtain by 
hearing these reports only once or few times. The initial reports are no more than mere Doxa. But 
if confirmed many times by reliable authoritative sources with respect to which lying is impossible, 
then they impart true authentic knowledge, which is suitable to be used in true indubitable premises 
in a valid logical demonstration, (al-Burhan). Al-Ghazali refuses to count as indubitable al-
Wahmiyat (i.e., clear and distinct subjective propositions), which are strongly adhered to on 
psychological grounds only . For al-Ghzali, clear and distinct propositions could only be accepted 
as logical truth if they are further supported by independent logical proofs. This is how it is possible 
for him, to separate truths of reason which may also be clear and distinct, from mere psychological 
insights which may also be clear and distinct, but not supported by an independent logical proof 
or demonstration. Incidentally, Descartes' clear and distinct ideas seem to be borrowed from Al-
Ghazali, as the latter's works translated into latin since the twelveth century, A.D. 
 
To al-Ghazali, the mere Wahmiyat are derived from al-Wahimah, a faculty closely allied to the 
common sense, since its main function to store the impressions of sensible objects, when they are 
no longer directly presented to the sense by their concrete persons or things. However, the function 
of al-Wahimah is not merely to store the singular impressions of things and persons, when they 
are no longer under the direct inspection of the sense. It moreover, has the power and capacity to 
synthesize these impressions into propositions, and exercise a fair latitude of freedom with respect 
to them. It thus can analyze, synthesize, and re-group and re-arrange them in any form it wishes. 
Thus, it is clear, that the propositions of the mere Wahmiyat could not be viewed as logical truths, 
solely on their psychological strength, since they could be imaginary, due to tampering and 
muddling of the Wahimah . Moreover, al-Ghazali rejects the Mashurat (commonly held, famous 
opinions) as suitable instance of true premises of logical proofs or demonstration; because although 
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these Mashurat could sometimes be true, they are sometimes false, no matter how commonly and 
widely accepted by the majority of people, or even by all. 
 
Examples of these Mashurat, given by al-Ghazali are : 
1) Telling lies is bad 
2) Deliberately causing pain to an innocent person is bad 
3) To be ungrateful is also bad 
4) To be grateful is good 
5) To save life is good. 
 
Al-Ghazali says, that although these Mushurat may sometimes be true, they are not to be viewed 
as axiomatic truths of the mind (Awaliyat), nor as Wahmiyat, that is, as clear and distinct subjective 
propositions. They are not inborn either, says al-Ghazali, but only acquired through the 
indoctrination of the society. This does not mean that these ethical propositions are not true in-
themselves. It only means that common people accept them as true without hearing valid sound 
arguments to support this acceptacne. They accept them, because they are taught to accept them 
by their parents, teachers, and by people whom they hold in high respect. Thus, for al-Ghazali, Al-
Mushurat, much quite like al-Wahmiyat, are not in all cases logically true : they need to be 
supported by independent logical proofs or demonstrations. 
 
(6) Epiloque : 
In conclusion, it would appear that the Islamic theory of knowledge made some significant 
departure from Aristotle's, though it remains indebted to him to the Neo-Platonalists, especially 
Plotinus. This theory has been launched by al-Kindi and al-Farabi, especially al-Farabi. But it 
reached its maturity in Ibn Sina and al-Ghazali. The main contributions are those of al-Farabi and 
Ibn Sina. But it is defintely Ibn Sina who must be credited with the new additions, and innovations, 
which managed to convert what was essentially an Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic theory into an 
Islamic Theory. The major contribution of Ibn Sina is his theory of indubitable logical premises, 
which al-Ghazali has accepted and summarized in the discussion above. The basic Ibn Sinian 
innovation here seems to be his inclusion among indubitable, logical truths (i) & (ii) the testimony 
of the sense, (internal as well as external), together with (iii) the general propositions drawn from 
the sense experience, i.e. at-Tajribiyat, and (iv) the authentic concurrent reports of reliable 
authorities. If we add to these what al-Ghazali here terms Al-Awaliyat (i.e., primary logical truths), 
we have five major types of logical truths, which are equally logical and indubitable, Namely: 
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(i) Al-Awaliyat (primary logical truths of reason) 
(ii)  Al-Hisiyat Al-batiniyat (direct testimony of internal sense) 
(iii)  Al-Hisiyat az-Zahiriyat (direct testimony of external senses) 
(iv)   At-Tajribiyat, (propositions drawn from experience) 
(v) Al-Mutawatirat : concurrent or congruent authentic reports of reliable authorities. 
 
In so far as nos. (ii) to (v) are material propositions drawn from experience of the outside world, 
the extent of the Islamists' departure from Aristotle and other Greek authorities is quite clear. It is 
also clear that the tendency towards the factual realities of the world, and the anchoring of logic 
on factual as well as cognitive grounds is an Arabic and Islamic addition though its germ exists in 
Aristotle. Yet the Islamic theory of knowledge remains basically cognitive, in that the intellect 
plays a crucial role in every instance of cognitive or epistemic process even though it derives from 
a diversity of sources, viz. Divine inspiration, sense-impressions, etc. Thus the role of the intellect 
is dominant, though it cannot operate without the assistance and the mediation of the senses, 
internal, as well as external. 
 
The corrigiblity of the intellect itself is guaranteed by its Maker, Allah (Subhanahu wa ta'ala.). 
This last statement must be accepted as a presupposition, if we are to avoid the circular statement 
that the intellect guarantees itself. Another way of escaping vicious circularity is to settle for the 
rather innocent circularity of saying that primitive logical truths are self-validating. 
The tendency towards the external world is no doubt one of the influences of the Holy Qur'an. The 
Qur'an has clearly accepted, as logically valid, the direct, intersubjective testimony of the external 
senses, and of the general propositions drawn from them. In so far as it is a Wahi (divine 
revelation), the Qur'an itself has been accepted as the authentic reliable, documented reports of the 
authentic prophet of God, Muhammad (Peace be upon him). 
 
Thus, the departure of Islamic philosophers from the essentially deductive theory of knowledge of 
Aristotle has its firm roots in the Qur'an itself. Moreover, the Islamicists emphasis of the 
ontological aspects of knowledge is also clearly a Qur'anic influence. According to these 
Islamicists, there are at least two essential ontological aspects that play a crucial role in the process 
of the human understanding : (a) the existence of God, Al-Mighty (b) The existence of external 
world. physical objects affect our understanding by supplying us with sense-perceptions, without 
which the process of understanding does not begin. 
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On the other hand divinely revealed knowledge proceeding from God-Al-Mighty, according to 
these Islamicists, affects our understanding, when it is (i) communicated to prophets, by means of 
Wahi and or (ii) is inspired into hearts and minds of men of understanding or wisdom. This 
communication takes place via the transcendental celestial intellects, especially the Active Intellect 
(Al-'Aql al Fa'al) . This three-legged characterization of the process of the acquisition of 
knowledge (i.e.,via the senses, natural reason, and divine reason (or inspiration) is due essentially 
to Al-Farabi, but it had been adopted and developed by Ibn Sina,and Al-Ghazali adds that, even 
natural reason is a divine gift. The testimony of the senses alone, quite separated from reason, is 
blind, and does not make sense, while natural reason alone cannot guarantee its own validity, 
because to say that reason validates reason is circular. God, the AlMighty must guarantee the 
corrigiblity of reason. Yet this last proposition is something rational to say, given that we accept 
the supposition that God-Almighty is the Creator of reason itself, whatever it may be. Since God 
is All-Good, and His Munificence is unlimited and most consummate he must have created reason 
in the most perfect condition, most sound and most suitable for its object of attaining sound, 
authentic knowledge. But if the soundness of reason is thus guaranteed by God, the Almighty, then 
the primitive a priori propositions which it affirms, e.g., "the whole is greater than the parts', and 
that "nothing could have as its predicates two contradictory properties at the same time " must be 
accepted as necessary true propositions, which are self-evident and stand in no need of any proof. 
According to this line of thought which is basically due to al-Ghazali, (18) it is rational to accept 
the proposition  that "Reason alone quarantees these primitive primary truths of reason." True , 
this last statement is circular. But this circularity is not vicious : Vicious circularity obtains when 
the conclusion is presupposed by the premises, in which case, we say that the fallacy of "Petitio 
principle" (19) is committed. In other words the circularity at issue, is innocent. One way of 
demonstrating this innocence is to proceed along the line proposed by al-Ghazali, when he alluded 
to the "light thrown upon his breast" (20). Al-Ghazali's metaphor of the "light" can be interpreted 
as the proposition, indicated above, that the soundnes of reason is guaranteed by God, the 
AlMighty. 
 
Since the soundness of reason is guaranteed by God, the Al-Mighty, what it "sees" as self-evident, 
and universally so, i.e., accepted by all, must be self-evidently true. Another way of "selling' this 
innocent circularity is to say that rationality amounts to no more than validity in self -contained 
axiomatic systems. These primitive propositions, such as "the whole is greater than the part", etc., 
will be mere axioms or presuppositions in these axiomatic systems. They are to be accepted as 
presuppositions of some proof or other. They commend themselves to the understanding as self-
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evident, clear and distinct; and, moreover, easily assented to by all. Nobody, who understands their 
meaning, would disapprove of them. Other traits of these axioms or presuppositions are : 
- consistency; no contradictions are admitted in the axiomatic systems. 
- they are simple and independent, 
- they are enough to make possible the derivation of all the truths that belong to the system in 
which they function as axioms and presuppositions. This is the condition of satisfiability. 
 
This innocent circularity is a methodological or deductive circularity. It is the circularity involved 
in saying that axiomatic systems internally guarantee the truth of their theories and premises. One 
may object to this kind of truth as being relative, since it is only guaranteed within the axiomatic 
systems. But one way of meeting this objection is to say that, we may construct as large, and as 
universal an axiomatic system, as we please, or manage to construct, it is still true, that, if the 
premises are self-evident and universally accepted, then  the conclusions and theories we manage 
to derive  within the system are near to universality and objective truth as anyone could get. 
 
In conclusion, these Islamic "Oriental"(21) philosophers, were not able to come up with a 
conclusive definition of knowledge, because, apparently, no such definition exists. This is still the 
case, in the contemporary philosophical scene today, knowledge is only definable in terms of either 
its subject matter, its methodology or its general characteristics. But nobody is quite clear what the 
essential nature of knowledge is . The Islamic philosophers, much as contemporary philosophers 
today, were forced to be content with a mere characterization of knowledge, a characterization that 
will do the job of distinguishing, in the first place, between knowledge and non- knowledge and, 
in the second place, will stipulate some essential properties which are common to all kinds of 
knowledge claims. For instance, knowledge claims must have the properties or attributes of being:  
 
i) exact in their expressions, 
ii) depict the outside reality of the physical world, in some way or other, 
iii) must be consistent, and free from contradictions, 
iv) must be objective, in the sense that their truths and theories must be intersubjectively valid, i.e., 
assented to by the experts and by the community of learned and intelligent persons at large. No 
reasonable objection to them are raised which cannot be met or answered conducively by the 
experts on the relevant field. 
v) they are provable, within the axiomatic system in which they occur. 
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vi) they are apodictic, either logically provable, or are supported by massive evidence, if they are 
inductive generalizations (e.g. Copper expands when heated. All Crows are black). 
One way to demonstrate the truth of these massively- supported inductive generalizations is to 
infer them as conclusions of a hypothetico- deductive systems. The premises of these systems 
could be of inductive or factual nature, and, or of primitive primary logical truths. They are to be 
accepted or " believed " because they are so evidently true, and sort of universally accepted by all. 
They evoke no rejection or protestation from any rational soul. Thus "believing" them is a rational 
thing to do. Since we have to start with some primitive propositions as premises, it is rationally 
better to choose them . Our preference of them over 
other competitors, is a rational preference, because the others are either plainly false, or merely 
subjective, not enjoying any universal support or proof. 
Since the publication of the Gettier thesis (22) (1963) on knowledge and belief, and his rejection of 
the traditional solution to the problem of how best to define knowledge (going back to Plato), there 
has been a spur of trials, nearly all of them unsuccessful. The problem of whether or not a 
satisfactory definition of knowledge exists is still an open one within these trials . To the best of 
my knowledge, it is still very much an open question to the present day of writing      this study. 
Thus, the Islamicists' failure to come up with a satisfactory solution to this very thorny cardinal 
problem of epistemology is hardly surprising. What the Islamicists tried to show, with some 
modest measure of success, I think, is to indicate that (i) knowledge is a function of the rational 
part of the soul, (ii) and that the soul is of divine origin and consequently of transcendental nature 
. In this context, it is possible to understand the immense attraction which they found in the 
emanation theory of Plotinus, though of course they subjected that theory to no small measure of 
amendments and alterations. In fact, it led to the development of a drastically new epistemic 
orientation, at the hands of these Islamic philosophers. Starting with al- Farabi's reference to the 
angels as referents to the celestial intellects, and to Gabriel in particular, as the Active Intellect, 
the Emanation theory was given an Islamic garment . Thus, Ibn Sina (Avicenea) spoke about ' al-
Feudh ar-Rabaniyya", i.e., God's munificence and generosity to man as well as animal, manifested 
in such phenomena as the baby's ability and competence, from the first moment, to suckle, to avoid 
falling down by clinching to any support he can find ; the fear and panic of a sheep in the first 
encounter ever with a wolf. To say that these traits are innate or inborn, or, to use a contemporary 
jargon, to say they are in the genetic code of these creatures, is just to push the question as to their 
origin a step backward. For both Ibn Sina, and al-Ghazali, these cognitive aspects of man's 
behaviour are a divine gift, a light from the ultimate source of all light and illumination, Allah, 
Subhanahu wa ta'ala . To inquire about these intellectual concerns is in the very nature of human 
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reason . It is not satisfied until it gets to the ultimate answers to these "whys", and will not be 
stopped. To try to stop it at an arbitrary point, in some intermediary cause or other, is tantamount 
to being anti-intellectual, and dogmatic. But this dogmatism is both futile and very inhuman to 
embark upon. 
Subhanka Allahuma wa bihamdika- Ashhadu an la illaha illa Anta. Wa as-salatu wa as-Salamu 
'ala sayyidina Muhammed wa 'ala alihi wa sahbihi wa Sallam. 
"The last of our prayers is Al-Hamdu lillahi rubbu al-'alameen” 
ركفت ( دلجم ،1  ،2( ددع ، )2  ،1 ، )2000  /1421                                                     ـهةفسلفلا 
ةفسلفو مولعلا  
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them under one list is the fact that they were greatly influenced by Greek philosophy, especially 
Plato, Aristotle and Platonus. 
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